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Voluntary Environmental Reporting Practices: 
A Further Study of ‘Poor’ Environmental Performers 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the relationship between ‘poor’ environmental performance and 
voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports of Australian listed companies.  ‘Poor’ 
environmental performance is defined as those instances where companies have been subject 
to a successful Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) prosecution at any time between 
1994 and 1998.  This area of research is important as the Parliamentary Joint Statutory 
Committee for Corporations and Securities (PJSC) recently concluded that a voluntary 
system of environmental disclosure would encourage ‘better’ companies to achieve ‘best 
practice’ in this area. Effective 1 July 1998, s299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law required 
details of a company’s performance in relation to environmental legislation to be included in 
the Directors’ Report. Due to the ambiguity in how the provision is to be interpreted it was 
referred to the PJSC which recommended that s299(1)(f) be removed. However, it still 
remains effective. Consequently, this study investigates what disclosure is in fact made in the 
period leading up to the mandatory requirements.  Results reveal that violating firms’ annual 
reports are limited to copious amounts of positive environmental disclosures of a general 
nature, with virtually no disclosure about the actual EPA violations.  We conclude therefore 
that it is unlikely that voluntary environmental reporting creates a situation of adequate and 
appropriate disclosure for poor environmental performers let alone encouraging ‘better’ firms 
to achieve ‘best practice’. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether voluntary environmental reporting 
practices produce satisfactory information on environmental performance.  As such we 
investigate the relationship between ‘poor’ environmental performance and the subsequent 
voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports of Australian listed companies.  
Companies with ‘poor’ environmental performance are defined as those subject to an 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) prosecution.  We investigate these companies over 
the period 1 July 1994 to 30 June 1998.  A voluntary reporting setting occurs over this period, 
as regulation pertaining to environmental performance disclosure for Australia was only 
introduced in July 1998. Effective 1 July 1998, s299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law required 
details of a company’s performance in relation to environmental legislation to be included in 
the Directors’ Report if the company operations are ‘subject to any particular and significant 
environmental regulation under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory.’ 
Due to the ambiguity in how the provision was to be interpreted it was referred to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities (PJSC), which recommended 
that s299(1)(f) be rescinded. In fact, on page 22 of its report the PJSC concludes that the 
voluntary system would encourage better companies to achieve ‘best practice’ in this area 
‘while the market will deal adversely with those companies that lag’.  To date, this section 
has not been repealed. Therefore this study provides direct evidence on what disclosure is 
actually provided in a voluntary environment and allows us to comment on whether the 
voluntary disclosure is adequate.  We examine if there has been any improvement in 
voluntary environmental disclosures by ‘poor’ environmental performers following on from 
the previous Australian study by Deegan and Rankin1 that covered an earlier period from 
1990 to 1993.  One expects that adequate disclosure should include a reference to EPA 
prosecutions and their impact in the annual reports. 
The research is important for two main reasons.  First, in examining annual reports 
over the period 1990 to 1993, Deegan and Rankin 2  discover that ‘poor’ environmental 
performers provide more disclosure than other firms but that such disclosure is almost always 
of a positive, general nature and unrelated to any environmental prosecution or performance.  
Second, voluntary reporting may be preferable.  Two arguments often put forward here are (i) 
                                                 
1 C.Deegan and M. Rankin, ‘Do Australian Companies Report Environmental News Objectively? An Analysis of 
Environmental Disclosures by Firms Prosecuted Successfully by the Environmental Protection Authority’, (1996) 9 
Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Jnl 50-67. 
2 Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
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that the quality of disclosure under a voluntary rather than a mandatory regime would be 
higher; and (ii) there was no evidence that voluntary reporting had been unsuccessful. 
In 1998 as part of the review and update of the Corporations Law the government of 
Australia put forward the proposal for several amendments to the Law under the guise of the 
Company Law Review Act.  This Review Act, after amendments, incorporated s299(1)(f) 
which requires disclosure of details relating to environmental performance in relation to 
environmental legislation to be included in the Directors’ Report.3  Given the concerns about 
the practical application of the section, its drafting, the fact that the government was opposed 
to the mandatory requirement as well as due process, the s299(1)(f) provision was later 
referred by the Treasurer to the PJSC for re-consideration.  The PJSC was given a mandate to 
review s299(1)(f) as to its suitability along with other matters in the Corporations Law.  The 
PJSC began the inquiry on Matters Arising from the Company Law Review Act in 1998 
through which a forum for consideration of and comment on the proposed legislation was 
made available.  In their discussion of the PJSC inquiry, Frost and English4 report that one of 
the most common issues for objection to the s299(1)(f) provision was that voluntary rather 
than mandatory reporting would produce ‘better’ disclosure.  A second less common 
objection was that there was no evidence to suggest that the voluntary reporting was 
unsuccessful.  “Fundamentally, the argument appears to be based on the reasoning that 
current voluntary reporting practices are producing satisfactory information on environmental 
performance”.5  Therefore this study is a vehicle to provide some evidence on this issue. 
A recent U.S. study by Hughes, Anderson and Golden6 addressed the issue of the 
relationship between corporate environmental performance and corporate environmental 
disclosure.  Results confirm differences in the extent to which different groups of 
environmental performers designated as ‘good’, ‘mixed’ and ‘poor’, disclose environmental 
information over the period 1992 to 1993.  They found that the good, mixed and poor 
                                                 
3 Section 299(1)(f) was not included in the initial Company Law Review Act 1998 tabled in Parliament but was, in fact an 
amendment tabled by Senator Murray of the Australian Democrats Party and supported in principle by the opposition 
Australian Labor Party.  At that time the Australian Democrats Party was a minor party but had the balance of power in 
the Senate. 
4 G.R. Frost and L. English, ‘The Introduction of Mandatory Environmental Reporting in Australia: An Analysis of the Ex 
Post Reaction by Industry and Government’ (2002) AAANZ Conference, Perth. 
5 See Frost and English, above n 4, at 16.  The PJSC began the inquiry on Matters Arising from the Company Law Review 
Act in 1998 by requesting written submissions.  Of the 89 submissions received, 46 commented on s299(1)(f), the majority 
(40) of which were identified by the PJSC as being opposed to the introduction of the provision (Frost and English, above 
n 4, at 9).  The second stage of the inquiry included six public hearings, which began in early 1999. 
6 S.A. Hughes, S., A. Anderson and S. Golden, ‘Corporate Environmental Disclosures: Are They Useful in Determining 
Environmental Performance?’ (2001) 20 Jnl of Accounting and Public Policy 217-240. 
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corporate performers’ disclosures did not differ within the president’s letter.  Significant 
differences between the three performance groups in terms of disclosure occurred mainly 
within the notes and the management discussion and analysis section (MD&A).  Overall, 
poor performers provide the greatest disclosure and the majority of these disclosures appear 
within the MD&A and notes rather than the president’s letter.  These results are comparable 
to those of Deegan and Rankin7 noted above. 
The role of accountants with respect to both the measurement and disclosure of 
environmental performance is an important one and has been highlighted in recent studies.  
For example, Shields and Boer 8  note in discussing the extent of the environmental 
commitments of U.S. firms that:  “The figures…. suggest that environmental responsibility, 
whether voluntary or through regulation is a major new challenge for business.  As the 
scorekeepers for business, it is logical that accountants would become involved in reporting 
on corporate environmental issues, particularly remedial liabilities; evaluating the incentive 
effects of the environmental movement on environmental management; and providing 
decision-makers with quantitative information on environmental performance” (p 43).9
Ilinitch, Soderstrom and Thomas 10  further elaborate on the importance of the 
measurement of environmental performance.  They note that in spite of the increased interest 
and focus on environmental activities the accounting profession has been slow to take on the 
role of defining, measuring, and controlling this broad corporate domain.  Consequently, 
measures of environmental performance have developed without clear, generally accepted 
guidelines as to what constitutes ‘good’ and/or ‘bad’ environmental performance.  Parker11 is 
one study that has addressed the difficult issue of developing and implementing 
environmental costing systems in Australia.  Parker discusses how, similar to other countries, 
environmental strategies and their related costs have received little formal attention from 
Australian accountants although some corporations are addressing these issues. 
Our study confirms that environmental disclosures in annual reports of violating firms 
are general in nature, overwhelmingly positive and with almost no disclosure of the actual 
                                                 
7 Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
8 D. Shields and G. Boer, ‘Research in Environmental Accounting’ (1997) 16 Jnl of Accounting and Public Policy 117-123. 
9 Shields and Boer, above n 8, at 117 state: “As of 1991, one estimate of the cost to clean up sites identified as hazardous by 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency totalled $752 billion...”. 
10 A.Y. Ilinitch, N.S. Soderstrom and T.E. Thomas, ‘Measuring Corporate Environmental Performance’ (1998) 17 Jnl of 
Accounting and Public Policy 383-408. 
11 L.D. Parker, ‘Environmental Costing: A Path to Implementation’ (2000) 10 Australian Accounting Review 43-51. 
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EPA violations.  We conclude there has been no improvement in environmental disclosures 
leading up to the implementation of s299(1)(f) and it is unlikely that voluntary environmental 
reporting creates an environment of adequate and appropriate disclosure for firms with poor 
environmental performance.  Overall, the role environmental information plays in the annual 
report is open to question.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 
discusses prior empirical research and section 3 describes the institutional background.  The 
research questions, data and the research design are described in section 4.  The results and 
discussion are presented in section 5 and concluding remarks are provided in section 6. 
 
2. Prior empirical research 
2.1 Overview of environmental disclosures and U.S. evidence 
Over the past decade there has been a steep increase in the quantity of environmental 
disclosures and the issuance of voluntary environmental reports that are independent of the 
annual report.12 The increase in disclosures is consistent with some companies being more 
sensitive to environmental concerns.  Possible reasons for that responsiveness are: increased 
regulation of corporations’ interaction with the natural environment, as well as increased 
reporting requirements and pressures imposed by community and lobby groups. 
However, only a minority of companies report environmental information in their 
annual reports and the disclosures are limited in nature, with inconsistent treatment of 
environmental matters across companies. 13  The diversity of practices regarding the 
accounting treatment and disclosure of environmental information is consistent with the 
inherent complexities of the issues and the exercise of discretion by companies in providing 
such disclosures.14  However, differences in firms’ reporting of environmental practices mean 
it is likely that the stakeholders of firms, including shareholders, employees and customers 
cannot, or find it difficult to, rely on such disclosures. 
                                                 
12 See, for example, G.O. Gamble, K. Hsu, D. Kite and R. Radtke, ‘Environmental Disclosures in Annual Reports and 10Ks: 
An Examination’ (1995) 9 Accounting Horizons 34-54;  E. Stanny, ‘Effect of Regulation on Changes in Disclosure of and 
Reserved Amounts for Environmental Liabilities’ (1998) 3 Jnl of Financial Statement Analysis 34-49; S.D. Beets and 
C.C. Souther, ‘Corporate Environmental Reports: The Need for Standards and an Environmental Assurance Service’ 
(1999) 13 Accounting Horizons 129-145;  and N. Brown and C. Deegan, ‘The Public Disclosure of Environmental 
Performance Information – a Dual Test of Media Agenda Setting Theory and Legitimacy Theory’ (1998) 29 Accounting 
and Business Research 21-41. 
13 See, for example, Gamble et al., above n 12; and C. Deegan and M. Rankin, 1997, ‘The Materiality of Environmental 
Information to Users of Annual Reports’ (1997) 10 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Jnl 562-583. 
14 See, for example, B.B. Stanko and T.L. Zeller, ‘Environmental Liability in Financial Reporting’ (1995) 41 Business and 
Economic Review 19-23; and W.D. Walden and B.N. Schwartz, ‘Environmental Disclosures and Public Policy Pressure’ 
(1997) 16 Jnl of Accounting and Public Policy 125-154. 
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Australian companies are surprisingly behind other countries in environmental 
reporting trends and major differences exist between the content of their corporate 
environmental policies and their subsequent environmental reporting and disclosures in their 
annual reports. 15  Of particular interest to this study is the finding by Tilt that while 
companies appear to be reporting on the environment internally, they place a low priority on 
providing environmental performance data to external parties. 
 
2.2 Australian evidence 
Early Australian studies on environmental disclosure grew from a broader literature 
set that examined the extent of and motivations for social responsibility disclosures.  Initial 
studies by Trotman and Bradley 16  and Guthrie and Parker 17  indirectly examined 
environmental disclosures by documenting the more generic disclosure practices relating to 
social responsibility.  Following on from these early studies, Deegan and Gordon18 examined 
specifically the environmental disclosure practices of Australian corporations in general.  At 
the same time Deegan and Rankin19 adopted a narrower focus concentrating on these same 
environmental disclosure practices but only for companies that had been prosecuted by the 
EPA (Environmental Protection Authority) in Australia.  This analysis of prosecuted 
companies is important as it provides a ready-made example of ‘poor’ or inadequate 
environmental performance as evidenced by an objective and legal standard.  It is clear that 
one, the level of disclosure provided and two, the incentives for the disclosure may be 
different for companies that have a track record of breaching legal environmental standards.  
These companies have, or may be perceived to have less than adequate social and 
environmental responsibility in their business, by investors and the community alike.  Finally, 
more recent research by Brown and Deegan20 concluded that a positive connection between 
the provision of environmental information by Australian companies and the notions of 
                                                 
15 C.A. Tilt, ‘The Content and Disclosure of Australian Corporate Environmental Policies’ (2001) 14 Accounting, Auditing 
and Accountability Jnl 190-212. 
16  K.T. Trotman and G.W. Bradley, ‘Associations between Social Responsibility Disclosure and Characteristics of 
Companies’ (1981) 6 Accounting, Organizations and Society 355-362. 
17  J. Guthrie and L.D. Parker, ‘Corporate Social Disclosure Practice: A Comparative International Analysis’ (1990) 3 
Advances in Public Interest Accounting 159-175. 
18 C. Deegan and B. Gordon, ‘A Study of Environmental Disclosure Practices of Australian Corporations’ (1996) 26 
Accounting and Business Research 187-199. 
19  Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
20  Brown and Deegan, above n 12. 
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legitimacy and media-agenda setting theories is based on the fact that higher levels of media 
attention are associated with higher levels of disclosure.21
The first study in this area was by Trotman and Bradley22  who examined social 
responsibility disclosures of some 207 Australian companies for the 1978 financial year.  
Included within the definition of social responsibility was a category for environmental 
disclosure.  Trotman and Bradley identified the link between the level of social disclosure 
and various factors or motivations thereof.  The factors considered important were (i) the size 
of the firm, (ii) systematic risk, (iii) social constraints, and (iv) the management decision 
horizon.  They found increases in both the systematic risk and size factors positively 
influenced the level of social disclosure provided.  However, while Trotman and Bradley 
empirically tested the association of the social environmental disclosures to the various 
factors they unfortunately did not separate out the various types of social disclosure, 
preferring to concentrate on an aggregate approach.  Accordingly, the level of and the effect 
of the factors specifically on environmental disclosure are difficult to ascertain. 
Guthrie and Parker23 examined corporate social disclosure in annual reports from a 
wider perspective comparing across a sample of U.S., U.K. and Australian companies for the 
1993 year.  They considered environmental, energy, human resources, products, community 
involvement and others within the broad definition of social disclosure.  Not surprisingly, 
Australia had the lowest level of social disclosure compared to the U.S. and the U.K.  For all 
three countries environmental information had the lowest priority and level of disclosure 
across the various categories.  In addition no company provided any bad news or negative 
social disclosure, which suggests that companies were withholding negative information from 
the market.  Guthrie and Parker did not test for potential explanations across the levels of 
disclosure, preferring to concentrate on simply reporting the level of disclosure itself.  In all 
though, the environmental and/or corporate environmental disclosure of Australian 
companies is seen as relatively poor. 
The first study to look specifically at environmental disclosures in Australia was 
Deegan and Gordon.24  They documented the disclosure found in the 1991 Annual reports of 
                                                 
21  The development and link of the legitimacy and media-setting theories to the variables and findings is not without 
controversy however.  It may be that the legitimacy and media-setting theories are subsets of/or related to one or more of 
the political cost, agency cost and/or information asymmetry based theories and are difficult to confirm exclusively or 
conclusively. 
22  Trotman and Bradley, above n 16. 
23  Guthrie and Parker, above n 17. 
24  Deegan and Gordon, above n 18. 
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a random sample of a wide cross-section of 197 Australian companies.  Their findings were 
both interesting and enlightening.  First and foremost, the environmental disclosures were 
mostly of a positive nature with only 7 percent of companies providing negative disclosure.  
This confirmed similar findings in the U.S. by Gamble et al.25 and the previously noted 
results of Guthrie and Parker.26  Second, environmental disclosures improved significantly 
over the 1980-1991 period.  This was again consistent with Trotman and Bradley27 who 
document a corresponding increase over the period 1972-1977.  Finally, those companies in 
politically sensitive industries provided the most positive disclosure.28  Hence, environmental 
disclosure is potentially one method of alleviating political pressure and community concern.  
In short, Australian corporations are loath in general to provide disclosure on environmental 
issues and if they do they are only likely to report positive information.  Thus while there are 
incentives such as litigation costs and reputation effects to release bad rather than just good 
news,29 the incentives do not appear strong enough to induce disclosure of EPA prosecutions 
or other environmental information and their negative publicity.  In contrast the documented 
increase in such disclosure over time reflects a growing awareness of corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
2.3 Poor environmental performance 
Research using measures of ‘poor’ environmental performance include Johnson, 
Magnan and Stinson, 30  Li, Richardson and Thornton, 31  Daley and Schuler 32  and the 
Australian study of Deegan and Rankin. 33   Annual reports have a low quantity of 
environmental disclosures that tend to be of a general nature.  Similarly for Australia, in order 
                                                 
25  Gamble et al., above n 12. 
26  Guthrie and Parker, above n 17. 
27  Trotman and Bradley, above n 16. 
28  Deegan and Gordon, above n 18, conclude that the positive nature of the environmental disclosures is consistent with 
legitimacy theory.  That said, they do not directly or empirically examine the factors or influences for the variation in 
disclosure across companies.  The fact that companies provide largely positive information on environmental issues may 
be consistent with one or a number of alternate theories either of an economic nature or otherwise.   
29  D. Skinner, ‘Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News’ (1994) 32 Jnl of Accounting Research 38-60. 
30  M.F. Johnson, M. Magnan and C. Stinson, ‘Nonfinancial Measures of Environmental Performance as Proxies for 
Environmental Risks and Uncertainties’ (1996) Working Paper, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. 
31  Y. Li, G.D. Richardson and D.B. Thornton, ‘Corporate Disclosure of Environmental Liability Information: Theory and 
Evidence’ (1997) 14 Contemporary Accounting Research 435-474. 
32  M.J. Daley and D.A. Schuler, ‘Do Firms benefit From Unethical Behavior? An Examination of Disclosures Related to 
Violation of Environmental Statutes’ (1999) Working paper, Rice University, Houston, Texas. 
33  Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
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to overcome the ‘good’ news phenomenon associated with environmental disclosure, Deegan 
and Rankin (1996) narrowed the focus of their research to examine solely corporations that 
have a demonstrated ‘poor’ environmental performance.  All Australian companies 
successfully prosecuted by the EPA (Environment Protection Authority) in the states of NSW 
and Victoria over the period 1990-1993 were examined.  The environmental disclosure in the 
annual reports was then documented.  The disclosure practices of prosecuted firms relative to 
a matched sample of non-prosecuted firms for the same years were then compared.  Matching 
was done based on size and industry for the equivalent financial years.  Second, the 
prosecuted firm’s disclosure in the year of prosecution was further compared to the same firm 
in years when they were not prosecuted.  Prosecuted firms were found to have more 
disclosure and the disclosure was of a positive nature compared to the matched non-
prosecuted firms.  In addition, there was an increase in the disclosure for the firms in the year 
in which they received a prosecution in contrast to those years where they did not.  In the 
same vein as Deegan and Gordon34 no empirical test of the factors that influence the level or 
the nature (positive or negative) was conducted.  However, Deegan and Rankin35 intimate 
that their results are broadly consistent with a legitimacy perspective, as there appears to be a 
need for prosecuted firms to provide enhanced positive environmental disclosures as a means 
of countering the negative news of the prosecution. 
 
2.4 Legitimacy theory and media agenda setting theory 
Most of the recent Australian research36 following on from Deegan and Rankin37 has 
emphasized the role of legitimacy theory in explaining the extent and nature of environmental 
and/or social information disclosures in annual reports.  It is argued that how an organization 
reports and operates is influenced to a large degree by the social values of the community in 
which it exists.  Therefore, adopting a legitimating perspective, companies use certain social 
disclosures to justify their existence.38  That is, firms will disclose information to legitimize 
their ongoing operation within that particular society.  This suggests that there is a ‘social’ 
                                                 
34  Deegan and Gordon, above n 18. 
35  Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
36  See, for example, Deegan and Rankin, above n 13; Brown and Deegan, above n 12. 
37  Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
38  Deegan and Rankin, above n 13. 
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contract between the organization and those affected by its operation.39  The organization is 
expected to comply with the terms of this ‘contract’ and these expressed or implied terms are 
not static.  In the event of a ‘breach’ of these terms (through an inability to justify its ongoing 
operation) the ‘contract’ can be revoked.  This may take many forms, from that of boycotting 
products to the elimination of the supply of labour, capital and supplies as well as increased 
levies, fines and laws imposed by governments through the lobbying of constituents.  The 
changing nature of these terms affects the disclosure policies and practices of firms that 
operate within the community. 
Deegan and Rankin 40  used a questionnaire to determine both the materiality of 
environmental issues to certain groups in society who use annual reports to gain information 
and whether environmental information is sought from annual reports.  Their results indicate 
that both shareholders and individuals within organizations with a review or oversight 
function consider that environmental information is material to particular decisions they 
undertake.  However, stockbrokers and analysts downplayed the materiality of environmental 
information.  In addition, shareholders, accounting academics and review organizations seek 
environmental information from the annual report to assist in making various decisions.  The 
annual report was perceived by the total group of respondents to be significantly more 
important that any other source of information concerning an organization’s interaction with 
the environment. 
Brown and Deegan 41  examine the relationship between the print media coverage 
given to various industries’ environmental effects and the levels of annual report 
environmental disclosures in Australia.  Using media agenda-setting theory and legitimacy 
theory, companies from nine industries are reviewed.  The results indicate that for the 
majority of industries in the sample, higher levels of media attention are significantly 
associated with higher levels of environmental disclosures in annual reports.  The authors 
posit that organizations continually seek to ensure that they operate within the bounds of their 
respective societies.   
As Neu, Warsame and Pedwell42  originally suggest and we put forward here the 
legitimacy, stakeholder and ‘political economy’ perspectives are not well defined and may 
                                                 
39  Brown and Deegan, above n 12. 
40  Deegan and Rankin, above n 13. 
41  Brown and Deegan, above n 12. 
42  D.Neu, H. Warsame and K. Pedwell, ‘Managing Public Impressions: Environmental Disclosures in Annual Reports’ 
(1998) 23 Accounting, Organizations and Society 265-282. 
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overlap or are intertwined with other frameworks that have socio or political economy 
assumptions.  The notion of impression management or image building arising from public 
pressure can potentially and comfortably fit within any of these frameworks. 
2.5 Content analysis 
Most of the studies43 following on from their U.S. counterparts44 use content analysis to 
describe the level of environmental disclosure.  In addition the two Australian studies above 
categorize disclosures in corporate annual reports according to the nature of the disclosure, 
namely whether it is, ‘positive’ or ‘negative’.45  There are concerns with content analysis 
mainly concerning the reliability first as a technique in the experimental design and second 
the potential different units of measure (sentences, number of pages and/or words) used.  The 
first aspect of concern relates mainly to the subjectivity of identifying the disclosure and 
determining whether it is positive or negative.  Moreover, content analysis is restricted to the 
level or quantity rather than the quality of the disclosure.  Regarding the second aspect, Milne 
and Adler46 look at the reliability of sentence coding and find that this form of the content 
analysis is generally reliable and the best alternative as a unit of measure provided it is 
carried out in a systematic manner. 47   In fact, Deegan and Gordon 48  and Deegan and 
Rankin49 find little difference in their results when using alternative measures.  More on the 
nature of and appropriateness of content analysis is provided later. 
 
2.6 Extension and merit of the current study. 
This study extends and complements prior research on environmental disclosures by 
prosecuted firms in several ways.  First, this study examines the extent and type of voluntary 
environmental disclosure given by poor environmental performance firms.  Hence we are 
                                                 
43  See, for example, Deegan and Gordon, above n 18; Deegan and Rankin, above n 13. 
44  See, for example, J. Wiseman, ‘An Evaluation of Environmental Disclosures Made in Corporate Annual Reports’ (1982) 7 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 53-68; W. Blacconiere and D. Patten, ‘Environmental disclosures, regulatory costs 
and changes in firm value’ (1994) 18 Jnl of Accounting and Economics 357-377; Gamble et al, above n 12; W.D. Walden 
and B.N. Schwartz, ‘Environmental Disclosures and Public Policy Pressure’ (1997) 16 Jnl of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 125-154; and Hughes et al, above n 6. 
45 The authors define positive disclosures as information that presents the company as operating in harmony with the 
environment and negative disclosures as disclosures that present the company as operating to the detriment of the natural 
environment. 
46 M.J. Milne and R.W. Adler, ‘Exploring the Reliability of Social and Environmental Disclosure Content Analysis’ (1998) 
12 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 237-256. 
47  Milne and Adler, above n 46, do note that for more detailed classifications, e.g., positive/negative items there is a learning 
effect of typically about 20 observations for the classifications to achieve a normal level of reliability. 
48 Deegan and Gordon, above n 18. 
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able to comment on whether such disclosure is adequate in identifying the EPA prosecution 
and any impact thereof.  Second, this study aims to establish if there has been any 
improvement in voluntary environmental disclosures by ‘poor’ environmental performers 
since the Deegan and Rankin50 Australian study of this issue for the years 1990–1993.  This 
is important as submissions to the PJSC claim that voluntary reporting of environmental 
information is preferable and may have better quality of disclosure relative to mandatory 
requirements such as s299(1)(f).  No evidence on the extent of and/or the ‘quality’ of 
environmental information is mentioned in the arguments submitted to the PJSC.  Finally, 
using Australian data permits examination of environmental performance reporting in a 
purely voluntary disclosure regime, in contrast to the U.S. and Canada that have some 
mandatory disclosure requirements through stock exchange disclosure.51
 
3. Institutional background 
The EPAs in Australia are state-run agencies with most legislation stemming from the 
various state parliaments.  Each state has similar environmental protection legislation, which 
is backed by the Federal environmental legislation.  As state-run authorities, each EPA has 
the power to prosecute or fine entities for breaches of the legislation pertaining to noise, 
water, air and any broader environmental protection issues that occur within their state or 
territory.52 The various state EPAs do not require any specific disclosures in companies’ 
annual reports. 
In Australia, until July 1998 no disclosure requirements relate specifically to a 
corporation’s environmental performance or any environmental related expenditures or 
obligations, except for certain requirements that apply to reporting entities in the extractive 
industries. 53  In addition, no mandatory criteria govern the recognition of liabilities in 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
49 Deegan and Rankin, above n 13. 
50  Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
51  There are no accounting standards on environmental disclosure.  SEC Regulation S-K items 101 and 103 require that the 
material effects of compliance with environmental laws on capital expenditures, earnings and a firm's competitive 
position, as well as any material information relating to pending administrative or judicial proceedings, be disclosed.  SEC 
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92 additionally requires that any environmental problem of known potential significance be 
disclosed.  The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC), in Policy Statement 5.10 requires companies to discuss 
environmental concerns in OSC filings.  These requirements are similar to those required by the SEC in the U.S. 
52 Any breaches that are deemed to be issues for Australia, for example, contamination of Australian waters, are processed 
through the Commonwealth Department of Environment and Heritage, under the Environmental Protection Act 1974 
(Commonwealth). 
53 Urgent Issues Group (UIG) Abstract 4: Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Restoration Obligations in the Extractive 
Industries was issued in August 1995, for reporting periods ending on or after 6 October 1995.  Under UIG Abstract 4, 
reporting entities in the extractive industries shall disclose separately information about the amount of restoration 
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Australia, leaving judgment to the discretion of accountants and managers.  The non-
mandatory Statement of Accounting Concepts SAC 4 states that a liability should be 
recognised if ‘the amount of the liability can be reliably measured.’ However, the nature of 
environmental liabilities suggests that they may not be reliably measured until incurred. 
Disclosure requirements for contingent liabilities are contained in AASB 1034 
‘Information to be Disclosed in Financial Reports,’ which applies to financial years ending on 
or after 30 June 1997.54 AASB 1034 replaced the old Schedule 5, which previously provided 
the disclosure requirements for financial statements.  The disclosure requirements for 
contingent liabilities under Schedule 5 and AASB 1034 are essentially identical.  For cases 
brought against the firm by the EPA that are unresolved at balance date, if the likely outcome 
is in favour of the EPA, any material contingent liability should be disclosed in the notes to 
the financial statements.  However, as the EPA fines of listed companies are small in absolute 
dollar terms they are unlikely to satisfy the criteria of materiality. 
Prior to 1 July 1998, the Corporations Law required no specific, mandatory 
environmental disclosures.  Effective 1 July 1998, s299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law 
requires details of a company’s performance in relation to environmental legislation to be 
included in the Directors’ Report if the company operations are ‘subject to any particular and 
significant environmental regulation under a law of the Commonwealth or of a State.55
Overall, the disclosure of EPA violations in the annual reports is voluntary up until 1 
July 1998. 56   Managers have discretion regarding what to disclose with respect to 
environmental matters for several reasons.  First, there is a lack of specific accounting 
                                                                                                                                                        
obligations recognised as a liability in the financial reports, and the accounting methods adopted in determining the 
liability for restoration. 
54  AASB1034 (clause 7.2) states that Contingent Liabilities include the following: 
(a)  liabilities of the entity which have not been recognised because: 
(i) of significant uncertainty as to whether a sacrifice of future economic benefits will be required; or 
(ii) the amount of the liability cannot be measured reliably; and  
(b)  items that are not recognised as liabilities because of significant uncertainty as to whether an obligation presently 
exists. 
The following information must be disclosed in the notes to the financial statements in relation to contingent liabilities 
(clause 7.1(c)): 
For each individual and category of contingent liability: 
(i)  a brief description of its nature 
(ii) whenever possible, the maximum amount that may become payable, which has not been recognised as a liability. 
55 On 1 November 1998, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) released Practice Note 68: New 
Financial Reporting and Procedural Requirements, which include guidelines on the application of the environmental 
reporting provision of the Act.  Practice Note 68 states that a breach resulting in conviction for an environmental offence 
represents a company’s failure to comply with a ‘significant and particular’ environmental law and therefore should be 
disclosed.  In addition, the ASIC is critical of insufficient disclosure of environmental regulations/risks/issues, and 
insufficient disclosure of compliance with relevant environmental requirements. 
56 One exception is ‘restoration costs’ in the extractive industries. 
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guidelines, other than standards dealing with contingent liabilities and their disclosure.57  
Second, there is inherent uncertainty about the potential materiality of environmental 
liabilities due to their contingent nature.  Finally, the size of the EPA fines imposed could 
mean that ‘materiality’ guidelines are not met. 
 
4. Research questions and method 
4.1 Research questions 
The inherent uncertainty about the potential materiality of environmental liabilities 
and the lack of reporting requirements leave managers with discretion regarding what 
environmental disclosures to make.  It is unclear à priori from a theoretical point of view 
what type of voluntary environmental disclosures the ‘poor’ environmental performance 
firms will make.  It is further unclear whether it will be specific, general, and/or positive or 
negative. 
The firm may provide additional positive disclosure to compensate for poor 
environmental performance.  Alternatively, disclosure of ‘bad’ news, such as in the form of 
earnings forecasts, may be a vehicle through which managers can discharge their legal 
obligation and avoid lawsuits.58  Similarly, disclosure of EPA prosecutions could benefit the 
firm. 59   However, in the absence of any legal incentive to voluntarily disclose EPA 
violations, managers could refrain from making any such disclosures due to concern about 
the negative publicity and/or political costs associated therewith.  Previous research has 
found weak and inconsistent results for the association between environmental performance 
and environmental disclosures.60  
Most studies of environmental disclosures consider the annual report as the major 
forum for disclosure.61  Neu, et al. 62 claim that narrative disclosures in annual reports are 
preferred to other forms of disclosure as their proximity to the audited financial statements 
                                                 
57 The extent of environmental disclosures required by the accounting standards is similar in Australia to other countries.  
The only accounting standards relevant to environmental disclosures in the U.S., Canada and the International Accounting 
Standards Committee (IASC) are those covering contingent liabilities.  
58  Skinner, above n 29. 
59  M. Freedman and C. Wasley, ‘The Association Between Environmental Performance And Environmental Disclosure in 
Annual Reports and 10Ks’ (1990) 3 Advances in Public Interest Accounting 183-193. 
60  See, for example, Wiseman, above n 44; and Freedman and Wasley, above n 59. 
61  See, for example, Wiseman, above n 44; Guthrie and Parker, above n 17; Deegan and Rankin, above n 1; and Tilt, above n 
15. 
62  Neu et al., above n 43. 
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provide them with a measure of credibility not afforded to other forms or organizational 
communication.  The auditor is required to read the whole of the annual report (AUS 212) to 
ascertain if any of the other information is inconsistent with the financial reports and that 
there is no material misstatement of fact.  This provides a supplementary degree of credibility 
by the process of negative assurance.   
Ceteris paribus, as the EPA annual reports disclose some aspects of a prosecuted 
firm’s environmental performance, some environmental disclosures are expected in the 
annual report.  However, it is not apparent whether firms are likely to specifically disclose the 
actual incurrence of an EPA prosecution.  Hence, we have two separate research questions to 
examine. 
 
Research Question 1:  Do firms subject to an EPA prosecution make specific disclosures 
about the EPA violation?  
 
Research Question 2: Do firms subject to an EPA prosecution disclose (positive) general 
environmental information? 
 
The next item of interest is where environmental disclosures are located within the 
annual report, predominantly whether or not the disclosures are audited.  Prior research such 
as Walden and Schwartz 63  reports that for the U.S. the disclosure of environmental 
information is made primarily in the non-financial, non-audited sections of the annual 
report.64
Earlier studies to look at the location of environmental disclosures in the annual report 
were the Australian study of Guthrie and Parker65 and the U.S. study of Hughes et al.66 
Guthrie and Parker report that format of social disclosure in corporate annual reports differs 
across countries with Australian reports mostly dispersing social disclosures through a variety 
of non-specific sections (64%) although a significant minority make disclosures in the 
Directors’ Report.  Hughes et al. report that that there are differences in the extent to which 
                                                 
63  Walden and Schwartz, above n 14. 
64 Here the financial section of the annual reports consists of the financial statements, supplementary schedules and footnotes 
all of which are audited.  It also includes the MD&A section.  The non-financial section is the remainder, which consists 
of the letter to shareholders plus any other portion. 
65  Guthrie and Parker, above n 17. 
66  Hughes et al., above n 6. 
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different groups of environmental performers: good, mixed and poor, disclose environmental 
information.  Overall, it is the poor performers that have the greatest extent of disclosure.  
The majority of these disclosures appear within the MD&A and notes rather than the 
president’s letter. 
Another consideration is whether or not the disclosures are audited. (i) The Financial 
Statements, (ii) the Footnotes and (iii) the Directors’ Statement constitute the financial report  
(s295) and the audited section of the annual report. 67   The (iv) Directors’ Report, (v) 
Chairman’s Review and (vi) the Review of Operations make up the non-audited section of the 
annual report.68  Audited information is viewed more credibly, because auditing is evidence 
of compliance with relevant laws and regulations.  However, audited disclosures incur the 
cost of ensuring compliance with the laws and regulations and the penalties are more severe 
(litigation etc.) for an incorrect disclosure.  It would be expected that in the absence of 
mandatory requirements companies would rather their environmental disclosures to be non-
audited and will be willing to provide more environmental disclosures in those sections. 
 
Research Question 3:  Do firms subject to an EPA prosecution disclose more environmental 
information in the non-audited sections of the annual report? 
 
Extending the argument above the ‘Review of Operations’ is predicted as the area 
most likely to contain environmental disclosure as the Review of Operations has virtually 
unlimited size and a lack of rules covering the content.  The Review of Operations is non-
mandatory, namely not required by the Corporations Law (s298) and the disclosure therein is 
not stipulated in any way.  Further, the managing director or chief executive officer (CEO) 
                                                 
67 The Corporations Law s295 requires all companies to prepare a Directors’ Statement that together with the financial 
statements and footnotes is considered part of the financial report to be audited (s301).  The directors' declaration or 
statement requires a declaration:  (a) that the financial statements, and the notes, comply with the accounting standards 
(s297); and (b) that the financial statements and notes give a true and fair view (s297); and (c) whether, in the directors' 
opinion, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the company, will be able to pay its debts as and when they become 
due and payable; and (d) whether, in the directors' opinion, the financial statement and notes are in accordance with this 
Act, including compliance with accounting standards; and true and fair view. 
68 AUS 212 requires any ‘other information’ in the annual report to be reviewed by the auditor to ascertain that the 
information contained therein is (i) materially consistent with the information provided in the audited financial report and 
(ii) there is no material misstatement of fact.  Examples of ‘other information’ include the Directors’ Report, financial 
summaries or highlights, employment data, planned capital expenditures, financial ratios, and/or a Review of Operations.  
Generally, the Review of Operations is any discussion in the annual report by the Managing Director or CEO reviewing 
the operations of the company during the period.  The Review of Operations is the closest we come in Australia to a 
general narrative.  It can be contrasted to the Directors’ Report, which is mandatory (ss298-300A) and must cover specific 
and general matters mainly relating to operating activities and disclosure of financial interests.  The Directors’ Report is 
comparable to the MD&A in the U.S., as the SEC regulates the content of the MD&A. (See, for example, Hughes et al., 
above n 6.) 
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normally prepares the Review of Operations where as the board of directors as representative 
of the owners must compile the Directors’ Report.  Hence the Review of Operations is more 
likely to focus on management and operational issues.  For example, managers might use the 
‘Review of Operations’ to release information that enhances the perception of the company as 
a ‘good’ corporate citizen. 
 
Research Question 4:  Do firms subject to an EPA prosecution disclose more environmental 
information in the ‘Review of Operations’ section? 
 
4.2 EPA Prosecutions  
All Australian listed companies that were successfully prosecuted by a State EPA 
between 1 July 1994 and 30 June 1998 were selected.  Prosecuted companies were identified 
from the EPA’s annual reports during the period.  The EPA annual reports are publicly 
available; provide details of all entities successfully prosecuted for breach of environmental 
protection laws, the amount of the fines imposed and either the date of successful prosecution 
or the financial year to which the prosecution belongs.69
Sample companies had to be listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) at the 
time of prosecution to ensure comparability and consistency in reporting and disclosure 
requirements. 70  Each prosecution in the EPA annual reports was examined to determine 
whether the company prosecuted was a listed company or the subsidiary of a listed parent 
company.  Parent companies were identified by reference to Dun and Bradstreet’s (1998) 
Who Owns Whom: Australasia and the Far East 1993 to 1998. 71  Twenty-seven of the 38 
prosecutions during this period were of subsidiaries of ASX listed companies.  In those cases, 
the analysis is undertaken of the parent entity disclosures. 
Appendix A contains the list of the sample companies, the prosecuted subsidiaries, if 
relevant, the amount of the fines, which State EPA prosecuted the company and the Act 
under which the company was prosecuted.  The final sample consists of 29 instances of 
‘poor’ environmental performance by 20 companies that were the subject of 38 prosecutions.  
                                                 
69 The NSW EPA did not provide exact dates of prosecution, but provided only the financial amount of the prosecutions.  In 
South Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory, and ACT there were no prosecutions imposed on listed companies. 
70 For example, Mobil Oil Australia Ltd. and Shell Australia Ltd. were eliminated, as they are not listed on the ASX.  
Australian International Carbon Ltd. was eliminated because it was prosecuted by the NSW EPA on January 1, 1995, but 
only listed on the ASX in August 1998.  Similarly, a 1998 prosecution of Caltex Australia Ltd. was excluded as the 
relevant balance date, 31 December 1998, fell outside the test period. 
71  Dun and Bradstreet, Who Owns Whom: Australasia and the Far East, 1993 to 1998, (1998) Dun & Bradstreet, London. 
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Of the 38 prosecutions, 11 prosecutions, relating to 9 annual reports, are for second or third 
offences in a subsequent financial year.  Therefore, 29 annual reports are available for 
analysis covering the period 1 July 1994 until 30 June 1998.72   Lastly, the annual reports are 
examined for environmental disclosures, which include all issues relating to the company’s 
interaction with the natural environment. 
 
4.3 Content Analysis  
Content analysis is used to convert the environmental disclosures contained in the 
annual reports into quantified variables that provide a systematic basis for comparing firms’ 
environmental disclosures.  Content analysis has been widely used in prior environmental 
accounting literature.73  In this paper, semantical content analysis is used to classify signs 
according to their meanings and allow replicable and valid inferences to be made from data to 
their context. 74 An appropriate content analysis scheme involves a trade-off between the 
reliable simplicity of using a small number of coding categories and capturing the complexity 
of the information using a large number of coding categories. 
The issue of analysing words, sentences or number of pages is discussed by Tilt75 
from earlier work by Hackston and Milne.76  Number of pages as a measure of disclosure is 
often said to be problematic due to differences arising from font size, margins, graphics etc, 
while the number of words causes difficulties due to concise or verbose styles of writing.  
Milne and Adler77 argue that most prior studies, while using words, paragraphs or pages to 
measure the environmental content of text, actually use sentences to code the content.  That 
is, sentences are used to determine into which category the text is classified.  Following from 
the above discussion, number of sentences was chosen as the most appropriate measure of 
disclosure in this study. 
A sentence is counted as one disclosure regardless of the length of the sentence.  
Likewise, a disclosure in the footnotes of an amount is also counted as one disclosure.  
                                                 
72  Companies with prosecutions in more than one period are: Amcor, BHP, Boral, Brambles Industries, CSR, Metal 
Manufactures and Wesfarmers. 
73  See, for example, Wiseman, above n 44; Blacconiere and Patten, above n 44; Gamble et al., above n 12;  Walden and  
Schwartz, above n 44; and Hughes et al., above n 6. 
74  K. Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction, (1980) Braton Press, New York. 
75  Tilt, above n 15. 
76  D. Hackston and M.J. Milne, ‘Some Determinants of Social and Environmental Disclosures in New Zealand Companies’ 
(1996) 9 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Jnl, 77-108. 
77  Milne and Adler, above n 46. 
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Headings are not counted as a sentence disclosure.  The above preserves the objectivity of the 
content analysis with no value judgements being made about disclosure quality.  The 
sentence disclosures are coded into one of five sub-sections, each relating to different areas of 
the annual report.  The five sections are the Chairman’s Review, the Review of Operations, 
the Directors’ Report, the financial statements and the footnotes to the financial statements.  
Each sentence is read and recorded in the appropriate category by placing a checkmark on a 
comprehensive worksheet.  The total quantity of disclosure in each sub-section of the 
corporate annual report is the number of sentences in that sub-section that relate to 
environmental issues.  The disclosure totals for each sub-section are added to yield the total 
number of environmental disclosures sentences for the full annual report.  
An example of environmental disclosures in the Review of Operations from the Boral 
Limited 1997 Annual Report (p. 11) is: 
Boral cares about the impact our operations and actions on employees, customers, the 
communities and environment in which we operate, ensuring that he/she meets both the spirit and 
the letter of the law and community expectations. 
 
There are two major limitations to using content analysis.  First, there is a necessary 
element of subjectivity involved in determining what constitutes a particular type of 
disclosure in each case 78  Second, content analysis assumes that the significance of a 
disclosure can be represented meaningfully by the quantity of disclosure.79.  The perspective 
in this paper is that sentence counts measures whether there is systematic variation in the 
level of disclosure rather than measuring disclosure quality. 
The disclosure contained in the Directors’ Report, Chairman’s Review and Review of 
Operations encompasses the total quantity of non-audited environmental disclosures in the 
annual report.  The non-audited disclosure not contained in the Review of Operations is 
referred to as the non-review section.  Similarly the Directors’ Statement, financial 
statements and footnotes disclosure all combined provide the total quantity of audited 
environmental disclosures.  The total quantity of environmental information contained for the 
full annual report is the sum of the disclosure totals for each sub-section.  The number of 
sentences that disclose information relating to the specific EPA prosecution is referred to as 
                                                 
78  D. Zĕghal and S.A. Ahmed, ‘Comparison of Social Responsibility Information Disclosure Media used by Canadian Firms’ 
(1990) 3 Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Jnl 38-53. 
79  J.B. MacArthur, ‘An Analysis of the Content of Corporate Submissions on Proposed Accounting Standards in the United 
Kingdom’ (1988) 18 Accounting and Business Research 213-226. 
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specific disclosure.  Equivalently, environmental information of a general nature in the annual 
reports of the violating firms is referred to as general disclosure.   
 
4.4 Classification of disclosure 
We classify the environmental disclosures as positive, negative or uncertain/neutral based on 
a similar approach to that of Deegan and Rankin.80 Positive/negative disclosures are defined 
as information where the company is presented as operating in harmony/not in harmony with 
the environment.81 In addition, uncertain (neutral or ambiguous) disclosures are defined as 
when environmental information is given but the impact on the environment is unclear.  
While some of the disclosures are not explicit we have classified them as being positive 
based on their implicit meaning.  For example, the following were classified as positive: 
Amcor is committed to managing its businesses around the world in an environmentally 
responsible manner at all times. (Amcor Limited 1996 Annual Report, p. 32) 
 
BHP's management of the Iron Baron spill demonstrated the value of its emergency planning and 
its Oil Spill Response Group. (BHP Limited 1996 Annual Report, p. 7) 
 
While somewhat ambiguous the second statement by BHP is classified as positive on the 
basis that BHP are claiming that management and response teams are very good at coping 
with environmental disasters.  Our decision is reinforced upon reading the remainder of the 
paragraph as BHP goes on to comment that “the cleanup is complete” and “monitoring of the 
environment will continue and lessons learned from the incident will further refine the 
Company's emergency management systems” (p. 7).  Classification as positive, negative or 
neutral in some cases is often difficult and somewhat subjective.82  
 We further distinguish the environmental disclosure into several distinct categories.  
This is useful as it enables a consideration of the type(s) of information most often provided 
as part of the environmental disclosure.  These categories employed are: (i) Environmental 
Rules where a company notes that it is subject to an environmental rule and/or policy, even if 
self imposed. (ii) Activity/Operating Performance statements reflect environmental activities 
that pertain to the potential impact on company operating performance. (iii) 
Activity/Financial Performance or statements about environmental activities and potential 
                                                 
80 Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
81 Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
82 Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
Third Draft: January 2005   21
Voluntary Environmental Reporting Practices: A Study of ‘Poor’ Environmental Performers 
impact on company financial performance and/or position. (iv) Liability/Expense Recognition 
comments concern environmental aspects that already have some recognition of 
liability/expenses.83  (v) Accounting Policy is where the firm comments on environmental 
issues with specific reference to the impact on accounting policy. (vi) Other Disclosures then 
refers to any miscellaneous environmental disclosure such as audits, pollution abatements, 
vision, strategic plan etc. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1 Descriptive statistics - specific and general disclosure 
Summary statistics for the various measures of annual report disclosure are presented 
in Table I.  First, disclosure is categorized as either specific or general.  General disclosures 
are then further decomposed into positive, negative or neutral.  Readily apparent is the fact 
that there is virtually no specific disclosure.  In fact only one company Boral Limited in only 
one instance in its 1997 Annual Report (p. 34) notes specifically it has breached 
environmental regulations: 
Regrettably, during the year in Australia one $5,000 fine was imposed for the release of turbid 
water, and three $500-$600 penalties were also incurred for waste discharge and administrative 
non-compliances. 
 
Even then when making this disclosure Boral is attempting to put a positive ‘spin’ on it by in 
the previous sentence on the same page suggesting only in Australia has it breached 
regulations and nonetheless has complied with overseas requirements. 
In line with Boral's commitment to comply with environmental legislation, regulations, standards 
and codes of practice, no fines or other penalties were incurred for environmental infringements in 
the USA, Europe, Asia or the Pacific. 
 
Presumably the breach in Australia is viewed as only a minor indiscretion notwithstanding its 
primary listing on the ASX. From the comment Australia is seen as not part of the Pacific 
region?  In the same Boral Limited 1997 Annual Report (p. 39) a second indiscretion 
(relating to health and safety rather than the environment) is noted. 
                                                 
83 At first sight, category (iii) is somewhat similar to category (iv).  However they are subtly diverse and so are kept separate.  
The basis for classifying category (iii) is where the firm discusses the impact of environmental matters in terms of 
potential impact on earnings, cash flows and/or capital expenditures.  We note that these environmental matters may 
include the settlement of payments, fines, as well as expenditures to improve the environmental impact or reduce.  In 
contrast, category (iv) identifies items where the discussion relates to an amount that is already actually recognized in the 
accounts namely that the firm must pay to an outside party on some future date. 
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Despite the Company's policies and actions, there have been a small number of prosecutions 
against subsidiary companies for breach of occupational health and safety and environmental 
legislation.  The largest fine imposed on a Boral company during 1996/97 was $75,000 relating to 
a discharge of LPG at Port Botany, NSW which occurred in 1991. 
 
– Insert Table I about here – 
 
On this evidence firms subject to an EPA prosecution simply do not make specific 
disclosures about EPA violation and by and large one would have to agree that this aspect 
disclosure is inadequate.  Firms do not voluntarily disclose this item.  Hence one is hard 
pressed to see this as encouraging better companies to achieve ‘best practice’ as the PJSC 
states.  One would think that firms having poor environmental performance would at least 
disclose the breach in the annual report in order for this to be seen as adequate disclosure.  To 
some degree this suggests that voluntary reporting is unsuccessful with only one 
environmental prosecution reported out of twenty-nine instances.  This reinforces, as some of 
the advocates for s299(1)(f) argue, that if the information is to be disclosed then it needs to be 
made mandatory.  Hence the case for s299(1)(f) seems reasonable provided one agrees (i) 
that this information requires disclosure, and (ii) that the purpose of the requirement is made 
clear and the statute can be worded appropriately.  However, these are separate arguments.  
That said, what is obvious is disclosures of EPA breaches were not made before the 
introduction of s299(1)(f). 
The second item is while firms with poor environmental performance do provide 
environmental disclosure it is (i) of a very general nature and (ii) is for the most part 
overwhelmingly positive in nature.  From Table I 21.93 sentences of environmental 
disclosure are provided on average per each annual report.  In itself, this level of disclosure is 
quite substantial.  Of this 17.21 sentences on average relate to positive aspects, 2.72 are 
neutral and only 2 sentences on average reflect items with a negative environmental impact.  
Clearly, while not surprising, this concentration of positive disclosure reflects an attempt to 
encourage the shareholder and public belief that the firm is in harmony with and is conscious 
of the environment notwithstanding the EPA breaches.  
An example of such positive disclosure and its attempt at reinforcement is again taken 
from the Boral Limited 1997 (p. 34) report:  
The environmental performance of Boral's businesses has continued to improve across 
approximately 1,000 operating sites worldwide.  Attention has initially been devoted to 
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compliance requirements.  As these programs progress, the businesses will increase their emphasis 
on industry specific best practice and the implementation of environmental management systems. 
This positive disclosure and the image of the company as a good social and 
environmentally conscious corporate citizen is manifest even in the face of environmental 
disaster.  The BHP disclosure is a prime example.  This is exemplified for both the Iron 
Baron oil spill off the coast of Tasmania in July 1995, and the environmental impact of the 
Ok Tedi copper mine in Papua New Guinea over the period 1994-1997.  BHP notes itself that 
in the environment area, both issues in particular have caused public concern.  However, in 
relation to Iron Baron oil spill the BHP Limited 1996 Annual Report (p. 37) notes: 
BHP's management of the Iron Baron spill demonstrated the value of its emergency planning and 
its Oil Spill Response Group.  The cleanup is complete.  Monitoring of the environment will 
continue and lessons learned from the incident will further refine the Company's emergency 
management systems.   
For the Ok Tedi situation the following is provided in the same 1996 annual report:84  
Resolution of the issues relating to the Ok Tedi copper mine in Papua New Guinea has been a high 
priority in 1996.  We have made good progress through 1996 on issues associated with the release 
of tailings and overburden from the mine into the Fly River system.  While the search for an 
environmental solution continues, Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) has continued to develop fair 
and straightforward methods for compensating the Ok Tedi and Fly River people for the mine's 
impact.  A compensation scheme negotiated with representatives of the national and provincial 
governments became law in December 1995. 
 
Interestingly, over our sample time period a significant difference exists in relation to 
the amount of general disclosures for firms prosecuted in more than one year as compared 
with firms having only a single environmental prosecution.  In Table I firms with multiple 
prosecutions over several years have a mean general environmental disclosure of 29.63 
sentences as compared to a mean of 16.63 sentences for firms with a single prosecution.  This 
difference in mean disclosure is statistically significant.  For cases where there are multiple 
                                                 
84 Similar disclosures are given in the Review of Operations for the BHP Annual Reports 1994 through to 1997.  This 
disclosure can be contrasted markedly both in expression and nature with that given under the requirements of the 
contingent liabilities accounting standard for each of the years.  For the 1996 BHP Annual Report the footnote disclosure 
for OK Tedi is –  
Legal proceedings were instituted in Victoria in May 1994 and December 1995, and writs were presented for 
issuance in Papua New Guinea in September 1994, against Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML) and BHP on 
behalf of plaintiffs claiming unspecified damages and other relief in respect of loss and damage allegedly 
caused by the discharge of tailings and other releases from the Ok Tedi mine into the Ok Tedi (river).  In June 
1996 all legal proceedings in Papua New Guinea and Victoria (including a writ issued in May 1996 against 
BHP, OTML and various officers and Directors) were discontinued.  The company considers that the terms of 
settlement will not have a material adverse effect on its financial condition or results of operations. 
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prosecutions within the same year less disclosure is evident so it is the fact that the 
prosecutions are occurring across multiple years and the reinforcement of the negative 
publicity in a number of periods that drives the increased disclosure levels rather than the 
number of prosecutions per se.  However, the extent of positive environmental disclosures is 
relatively higher when compared to total disclosure for those firms with a single 
environmental prosecution (87.2%) compared to firms with multiple prosecutions over 
multiple years (74.3%).  This is notwithstanding the fact that the differences in the amount of 
positive, negative and neutral disclosure are all statistically significant across the various 
prosecution types as evident in Table I.  The high absolute disclosure in all cases for the 
multiple environmental prosecutions firms drives this result.  That said, as the balance of the 
non-positive disclosure is largely neutral none of the prosecuted companies show evidence of 
providing negative aspects of their environment performance despite their prosecution and 
their poor environmental performance track record.  In short, firms subject to an EPA 
prosecution do disclose general environmental information but the disclosure remains almost 
exclusively of a positive nature. 
These above results are reinforced when environmental disclosures are compared for 
initial reports - where the first prosecution occurs, in contrast with subsequent reports - where 
there was a repeat prosecution in later years.85  Again, an average of 35.78 sentences of 
disclosure is provided in the subsequent annual reports significantly higher than the 15.70 in 
the annual reports relating to initial prosecutions. 
The empirical results evidence that environmental disclosure is mainly about 
corporate image building and impression management.  In this area the impression conveyed 
is one of a ‘good’ corporate citizen and environmentally friendly company.  The image put 
forward is at odds with the reality of poor environmental performance as suggested by the 
EPA prosecution.  In fact the greater the extent of ‘poor’ performance as indicated by 
multiple prosecutions over many years then (i) the level of environmental disclosure 
increases and (ii) for subsequent report years the extent of the positive nature of the 
disclosure is additionally increased.  Similarly, even for initial prosecution periods the extent 
of the disclosure in the annual reports is greater for habitual EPA offenders when compared 
to those firms that have single environmental prosecutions over the sample period.  Hence the 
evidence reveals that the attempt at impression management becomes more intense to counter 
                                                 
85 Initial reports include the single environmental prosecutions (8), multiple environmental prosecutions within one year (5) 
as well as a portion of the multiple environmental prosecutions across more than one year (7). 
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the negative image of the EPA prosecutions put forward in the EPA annual list of offending 
companies and the negative publicity given in the media for such offences.  Neu et al. (1998) 
provide a good overview of the idea and evidence of impression management in relation to 
Canadian environmental disclosures.  They suggest that the impression management is 
directed to relevant publics who are interested in the environmental disclosure, the prime 
groups being the financial stakeholders and regulators with environmentalists as a secondary 
interest group. 
 
5.2 Location of disclosure 
Given the paucity of specific disclosures on the EPA prosecutions we concentrate the 
remaining discussion and analysis on general environmental disclosure.  We see from Table 
II that the most extensive level of disclosures is in the Review of Operations.  The Review of 
Operations has 16.14 out of a total mean disclosure of 21.93 sentences.  Very little disclosure 
occurs in the Directors’ and/or the Chairman’s Reports with an average of 0.76 sentences and 
0.48 sentences respectively.  These three sections combine together to form the non-audited 
section with an average disclosure of 17.38 sentences.  In contrast the audited section of the 
annual report with a mean disclosure of 4.55 sentences has a substantially less level of 
environmental disclosure.  No disclosure occurs in the Directors’ Statement. 
– Insert Table II about here – 
We now specifically test the differences between audit and non-audit and between the 
Review of Operations and the rest of the non-audit section of the annual report to see if they 
are significant.  From Table III the mean/median difference between the two locations is 
substantial and is of the order of 12.83/7.00 sentences of environmental disclosure.  In 
addition Table III confirms unequivocally a significant difference between the disclosure 
levels in the non-audited part (Directors’ Report, Chairman’s Report and Review of 
Operations) compared to the audited part (the financial statements and footnotes).  The 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs rank sign test is significant at p<0.000.  Of the 29 matched 
differences, 25 are positive, 3 negative and the remainder are tied. 
– Insert Table III about here – 
The non-review section comprises the remainder of the non-audit locations namely 
the Directors’ and the Chairman’s Reports.  In the same vein the environmental disclosure in 
the Review of Operations is substantially and significantly different from the non-review 
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section.  The Wilcoxon matched-pairs rank sign test is yet again significant at p<0.000.  The 
mean/median differences in the level of environmental disclosure are 14.90/9.00 for this 
comparison.  Clearly, from Tables II and III the bulk (74%) of the level of environmental 
disclosure is concentrated in the non-audited, non-statutory Review of Operations portion of 
the annual report.  This fits in with the conjecture of impression management noted above as 
this location provides the most latitude possible to present extensive positive information to 
reinforce the firm’s image. 
Table IV compares the mean disclosure of the various categories for the annual report 
as a whole as well as for the different annual report locations.  The most disclosure is found 
in the Review of Operations section and is related to discussing environmental activity and 
the potential impact on firm performance and/or operations.  The Activity/Operating 
Performance section has a mean of 11.59 sentences or 53% of environmental disclosures out 
of a total mean 21.93 sentences disclosure for the full annual report.  The Environmental Rule 
category has a mean of 3.69 sentences and Liability/Expense Recognition accounts for a 
further mean 2.69 sentences.  Consequently some importance is placed on this form 
disclosure but nowhere near the magnitude or the level of the Activity/Operating 
Performance category.  Naturally a significant majority of the environmental disclosure 
concerning liability/expense recognition is located in the financial statements and footnotes.  
The remainder of the disclosure - an average of 3.96 sentences – relates to the Accounting 
Policy, Activity/Financial Performance and/or the Other Disclosure categories.  These items 
do not appear to be a major focus of disclosure. 
Obvious differences thus exist in the type of environmental information that is 
provided.  The typical environmental disclosure then is general in nature, located in the 
Review of Operations and the main aim is to promote the ‘feel good’ factor of the company 
at one with the environment.  At the same time the disclosure most often focuses on the 
potential environmental impact on firm operating performance or operations.  An extract 
from Boral Limited 1994 Annual Report (p. 25) provides a good example: 
Boral recognises the need to protect the environment in order to allow sustained economic 
development for the long term benefit of the community.  Caring for the environment is not just a 
social responsibility but an essential part of modern business practice.  All Boral businesses are 
committed to effective environmental management and continually strive to minimise or eliminate 
any adverse impacts arising from the normal course of operations. 
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We now compare our results to previous studies and examine their implications as 
well as finally looking at some factors that may explain the level of voluntary environmental 
disclosure provided. 
– Insert Table IV about here – 
5.3 Discussion and Implications 
Our results are partly similar to, and reinforce the results of, the earlier Australian 
study of ‘poor’ environmental performers by Deegan and Rankin.86  That said, there are some 
notable differences that warrant discussion as well.  The similarities with Deegan and Rankin 
are: extensive positive disclosures, limited negative disclosures and virtually no mention of 
the environmental fine.  As well, both studies note that many companies use the Review of 
Operations section of the annual report to include a separate subsection of environmental 
matters.  Moreover, Deegan and Rankin find that 12 out of 20 of prosecuted companies 
disclose some environmental information in the Directors’ Report location.  This is similar to, 
but slightly more than, our results where 11 firms out of 29 disclose in this location. 
Differences exist when one focuses directly on the amount of environmental 
information rather than simply the number of companies.  We find that the Review of 
Operations is clearly preferred and has on average 74% of the total environmental disclosure 
in the annual report.  Our results confirm that environmental disclosures are more likely to be 
made in the non-audited non-statutory review of operations section of the annual report.  
Firms that have multiple environmental prosecutions over more than one year provide 
significantly more general environmental disclosure on average compared with firms that 
only have single or multiple prosecutions within the one year. 
Several implications arise from the results so far.  First, firms use environmental 
disclosure in a self-promoting manner disclosing almost solely positive or at the very least 
neutral items.  The fact that those firms that have multiple prosecutions over numerous years 
give more positive and general environmental disclosure implies that firms use this disclosure 
as a form of impression management reinforcing their image as a good social and corporate 
citizen.  This is done to counteract the negative impact that the prosecution.  Second, this 
suggests a form of ‘procrustean’ disclosure where the information provided is stretched or 
squeezed to fit in with the view that managers think society wants to receive.  The actual 
event narrative is then compiled to be consistent with this desired framework regardless of 
                                                 
86 Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
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the actual facts (as with the BHP example).  Stated simply, managers selectively disclose the 
bits they think are in accord with what society wants and/or put a positive slant on the bits 
that reflect poor or negative environmental acts (Boral and BHP examples).87  Third, the 
problem with this image building approach especially by firms that have poor environmental 
performance is that it creates a credibility gap for environmental information.  The 
information on the EPA prosecutions is publicly available and failure to provide any negative 
information is at odds with reality.  As noted by Deegan and Rankin88 this may impair the 
credibility of other (voluntary) information in the annual report.  In order to counter this 
Beets and Souther 89  suggest that accounting firms should review and provide assurance 
services on environmental reports in an effort to increase the credibility of the disclosure.  
More to the point our view is that it may create a general reputation effect, which flows over 
to all companies that such information is only ‘lip service’.  Effectively this creates a 
’lemons’ problem in that investors and society are simply not able to distinguish between 
good and poor environmental firms on the basis of information in the annual report s it is 
unreliable. 
 Concerning the regulatory aspect our conclusion is that there is no adequate 
notification of EPA prosecutions in the annual reports.  If this is considered desirable then it 
needs to be regulated.  Furthermore, given present evidence, it is difficult to see how the 
disclosure under a voluntary regime would be better and it seems as if the voluntary 
disclosure has been unsuccessful in terms of the criteria of (i) providing adequate notification 
of negative environmental impact information and (ii) allowing the users of financial 
statements to adequately distinguish between good, moderate or poor environmental 
performance.  In short, the submission comments to the PJSC as noted previously are viewed 
as a little misdirected to say the least. 
The above discussion should not be taken to suggest that we are equivocally 
supporting blanket legislation for environmental reporting.  Far from it, as noted in the PJSC 
submissions and the report conclusions there are many issues for and against the existing 
s299(1)(f) environmental legislation, not least being the fact that the existing legislation is 
poorly worded and incoherent as to what it requires in terms of disclosure.  Associated with 
                                                 
87 This is similar to the conclusion reached by Wiseman, above n 44, for the U.S. and Neu et al., above n 42 for Canadian 
environmental disclosures. 
88  Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
89  Beets and Souther, above n 12. 
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this is that it is not clear what the benefits/costs of environmental disclosure are and/or 
whether it should even be contained in the annual report, the prime purpose of which is 
naturally to present material financial information and not be a vehicle for self-laudatory 
advertising.  Frost and English (2002) discuss all these and the other arguments put forward 
in the PJSC submissions and summary.90
 
5.4 Explanatory factors for the level of disclosure 
As noted previously, inherent uncertainty about the materiality of environmental liabilities 
and the lack of formal reporting requirements leave managers with discretion regarding the 
nature and extent of environmental disclosure.  Coupled with this, when parties external to 
the firm disseminate information about firm environmental performance (through EPA 
prosecutions) public awareness is increased of information, which was previously part of 
managers’ private endowment.  In these situations, there are obvious incentives for, and 
consequently increased environmental disclosures by the firm are expected.91  Many factors 
may induce voluntary reporting and we now conduct a brief exploratory analysis to see if the 
general level of environmental disclosure is influenced by some of the more obvious and 
identifiable factors.  We examine several factors commonly noted in the literature. (i) The 
level of negative signal or bad publicity associated with the environmental infringement, (ii) 
the amount of information asymmetry, (iii) proprietary costs and finally, (iv) firm size. 
Given the EPA prosecutions it is natural that these firms are under public scrutiny and 
firms are likely to provide positive general environmental news to counter the negative news 
of the prosecution.92  Presumably the greater the fine, the greater the level of environmental 
disclosure needed by the firm in an effort to compensate for the negative publicity, media 
interest and potential harm to firm reputation.  The amount of the fine for the environmental 
infringement (Fine) may influence the level of disclosure as it represents the severity of the 
environmental breach, the prosecution and resulting sanction. 
Economic analysis suggests that managers voluntarily disclose information when the 
benefits from disclosure outweigh the costs.93 Specifically in the environmental information 
                                                 
90 At the time of writing amendments to rescind s299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law have been put forward to be tabled in 
parliament a direct a result of the recommendation of the PJSC that the section be removed.  It seems Australia’s flirt with 
mandatory environmental reporting requirements is nearly over at least for the moment. 
91  Li et al., above n 31. 
92  Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
93  R. Verrecchia, ‘Discretionary Disclosure’ (1983) 8 Journal of Accounting and Economics 175-195. 
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area Li et al. 94 present evidence that managers reveal environmental information 
‘strategically’, or to serve some ulterior purpose in addition to reducing any information 
asymmetry that exists between managers and current and potential investors and other users.  
The empirical proxy used here for information asymmetry is the extent of minority 
stakeholders.  The extent of minority interest (InfoAsy) is measured as 100% minus the 
percentage of wholly owned subsidiaries. 
Verrecchia 95  has shown that having substantial existing proprietary costs from 
competition accordingly discourages disclosure.96  If the product market share of a few large 
firms in an industry is high, they dominate and this discourages a lack of product market 
competition in the industry.  When product market share is limited or highly concentrated in a 
few firms there is low product market competition.  So the lower the proprietary costs, as 
represented by low product market competition, then the more firms will voluntary disclose  
information. 97   The measure used for proprietary costs is: 100% minus the industry 
concentration ratio percentage (PropC). The industry concentration ratio then is the 
percentage of sales revenue of the largest company in a given industry relative to total 
industry sales revenue.  All sales revenues for companies and industries are as reported from 
the Business Review Weekly: Top 1000. 
Empirical studies suggest that firm size is an important determinant of corporate 
policy choices.  Lang and Lundholm98 argue that the annual reports of larger companies are 
more likely to be scrutinised by financial analysts and have greater media attention than 
smaller entities.  They are also more likely to be subject to regulatory scrutiny and political 
costs.  Larger firms will disclose more environmental information in order to satisfy analyst 
demand, media attention and reduce political costs.  The measure of firm size adopted is the 
                                                 
94  Li et al., above n 31. 
95  Verrecchia, above n 93. 
96 Here we concentrate on the competition aspect of proprietary costs.  See Li et al., above n 31 for a discussion of the many 
different proprietary costs relevant for different user groups with respect to environmental disclosure. 
97  Theoretical models of manager’s disclosure decisions provide mixed directions between competition (proprietary costs) 
and disclosure.  If managers through non-disclosure protect excess profits, then some models of voluntary disclosure 
predict a higher level of competition thus increasing disclosure (see for example, R. Hayes and R. Lundholm, ‘Segment 
Reporting to the Capital Market in the Presence of a Competitor’ (1996) 34 Journal of Accounting Research 261-279; and 
M.S. Harris, ‘The Association between Competition and Managers’ Business Segment Reporting Decisions’ (1998) 36 
Journal of Accounting Research 111-128).  In other models firms provide more disclosure when there is less competition 
or rivalry, especially where there are existing competitors and they do not alter production levels in response to negative 
disclosures. (See, for example, Verrecchia, above n 93).  The second situation is considered the most likely for 
environmental reporting but it is ultimately a contextual and empirical question. 
98 M. Lang and R. Lundholm, ‘Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosures’ (1993) 31 
Journal of Accounting Research 246-271. 
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natural logarithm of total firm value (Size).  Firm value is the sum of market value of equity 
and the book value of total liabilities.  The extent of general level of environmental 
disclosures (GenEnv) is measured by the total number of sentences of disclosure in the annual 
report. 
Results of the association of the individual variables with GenEnv are given in Table 
V Panel A.  The GenEnv variable is significantly negatively related to proprietary costs and 
positively related to firm size.  The multivariate model in Table V Panel B confirms the 
univariate results and again that the level of general environmental disclosures is significantly 
negatively influenced by the extent of proprietary costs and significantly positively related to 
firm size.  The variable Fine does not appear to be a good substitute for the resulting negative 
publicity or the seriousness of the prosecution.  Contrary to our prediction Fine has a negative 
relationship with the level of disclosure (GenEnv) albeit not a significant one. 
– Insert Table V about here –  
Our finding of firms subject to lower proprietary costs providing more environmental 
disclosure is consistent with the work of Li et al.99 although they do not measure proprietary 
costs explicitly preferring to impute them from the fact that the firms are prosecuted.  More 
importantly the significance of the Size and PropC variables are in agreement with the 
impression management framework of Neu et al. as the relevant publics, i.e. the financial 
stakeholders and government, are likely to view environmental disclosure as more important 
for large firms and for firms in which there is low competition and hence greater abnormal 
profit.  Environmental disclosure does have a multifaceted framework attempting to appease 
relevant users or publics. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions  
This paper examines the question of whether voluntary environmental reporting 
practices produce satisfactory information on environmental performance.  As such we 
investigate the relationship between ‘poor’ environmental performance and the subsequent 
voluntary environmental disclosures in annual reports of Australian listed companies. ‘Poor’ 
environmental performance is defined as companies subject to an EPA prosecution between 
1994 and 1998. Effective 1 July 1998, s299(1)(f) of the Corporations Law requires details of 
a company’s performance in relation to environmental legislation to be included in the 
                                                 
99 Li et al., above n 31. 
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Directors’ Report. Due to the ambiguity in how the provision is to be interpreted it was 
referred to the PJSC which recommended that s.299(1)(f) be deleted. As yet, this section has 
not been deleted. 
Only one instance of specific disclosure relating to the EPA prosecution is found in 
this research. In their study of the 1990 – 1993 periods, Deegan and Rankin100 report only 
two organizations made any reference to the EPA prosecution.  This was out of 78 
prosecutions by 20 companies.  Consistent with Deegan and Rankin101 the vast majority of 
the disclosures on the environment related to general matter and for the most part are positive 
in nature.  Very limited negative environment disclosure occurs.  Broadly our results are 
similar to the Australian paper of Deegan and Rankin,102  Gamble et al.,103 and the U.S. 
paper of Hughes et al. 104   Interestingly, companies that have been subject to multiple 
environmental prosecutions over the time period studied made significantly more 
environmental general and positive disclosures relative to companies that have a single 
environmental prosecution. 
A significantly greater amount of environmental disclosure is found in the non-
audited section of the annual report in contrast to the audited section of the annual report.  
Very little environmental disclosures are found in the Directors’ or Chairman’s Report.  Most 
disclosure is located in the Review of Operations section and significantly more disclosure is 
provided in that section as compared to the other non-audit sections.  The majority of 
environmental disclosure is concerned with the impact on firm operations and other items of 
environmental information disclosure are the minority. 
An exploratory analysis of the factors that influence the general level of voluntary 
environmental disclosures, as provided by firms that have poor environmental performance, 
reveals that the level of voluntary environmental disclosures is negatively related to the 
extent of proprietary costs and positively related to firm size.  Hence the smaller the 
magnitude of proprietary costs, as measured by the degree of product market competition in 
the industry, the greater the quantity of voluntary environmental disclosures. 
                                                 
100 Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
101 Deegan and Rankin, above n 13. 
102 Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
103 Gamble et al., above n 12. 
104 Hughes et al., above n 6. 
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Overall, firms that have been prosecuted by the EPA have little disclosure either for 
the prosecution itself or concerning any environmental information with a negative impact.  
Hence, there has been no improvement in environmental disclosure following on from the 
previous evidence in Deegan and Rankin.105  The credibility of environmental disclosure is 
generally low.  This, of course, is with the proviso that one believes that this information is 
valuable.  It follows that comments in the submission to the PJSC are demonstrated to be 
incorrect.  Voluntary disclosure does not provide an adequate means of notification of the 
prosecutions.  Further, there is evidence that the voluntary reporting does not in any way 
encourage poor performing firms to release information with a negative connotation.   
Consistent with Neu et al.106 our view is that environmental disclosure in its present 
form is simply a means of providing managers with the opportunity to send the ‘right 
message’ to financial stakeholders.  Of particular importance is the fact that managers are 
engaging in impression management to convince the financial stakeholders, government and 
to a lesser extent the environmentalists that the firm is a ‘good corporate citizen’.  As such, 
managers engage in selective reporting of environmental information and facts, dictating 
which items they wish to release to the public while obfuscating and misrepresenting the 
negative environmental impact and performance of the firm.107  
Our results suggest further research is needed.  One avenue is to examine whether the 
environmental disclosures of companies subject to an EPA prosecution increased after the 1 
July 1998 following the introduction of mandatory environmental reporting through 
s299(1)(f).  Another avenue is the association between environmental disclosures and 
economic performance of companies subject to an EPA prosecution.  Of prime interest 
though would be research that examines the situations when, and reasons for, firms providing 
valuable information that relates to environmental performance rather than engaging in 
impression management techniques which alter user perceptions and/or simply change the 
focus of the users’ attention. 
 
105 Deegan and Rankin, above n 1. 
106 Neu et al., above n 42. 
107 See for example, Wiseman, above n 44. 
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TABLE I: Overall sample and summary statistics of environmental disclosure practices 
 No. of 
Companies
No. of 
Annual 
Reports 
No. of 
Prosecutions 
Mean 
Specific 
Disclosure 
Mean 
General 
Disclosure 
Mean 
Positive 
Disclosure 
Mean 
Negative  
Disclosures
Mean 
Neutral 
Disclosure 
Panel A – Breakdown by Number of Prosecutions:     
Single Env Prosecutions 8 8 8 - 16.63 14.50 0.63 1.50 
Multiple Env Prosecutions 
(within one year) 
5 5 10 - 5.80 5.80 - - 
Multiple Env Prosecutions 
(across many years) 
7 16 20 0.25 29.63 22.13 3.31 4.19 
Total  20 29 38 0.14 21.93 17.21 2.00 2.72 
Tests of differences in disclosure between categories of number of prosecutions:     
K-W test            
(p-value) 
    9.69   
(0.008) 
5.65    
(0.059) 
9.09   
(0.011) 
7.48   
(0.024) 
Panel B – Breakdown by Annual Report Category:     
Initial Report 20 20 27  15.70 13.10 1.25 1.35 
Subsequent Report - 9 11 0.44 35.78 26.33 3.67 5.78 
Total  20 29 38 0.14 21.93 17.21 2.00 2.72 
Tests of differences in disclosure between annual report categories:     
K-W test            
(p-value) 
    6.02   
(0.014) 
4.61    
(0.032) 
4.60   
(0.032) 
4.16   
(0.041) 
         
Notes to Table:  
The prosecution types are defined as follows: 
Single Environmental Prosecutions: only one EPA prosecution and within a single year. 
Multiple Environmental Prosecutions within one year: multiple EPA prosecutions all within one year. 
Multiple Environmental Prosecutions across many years: multiple EPA prosecutions over numerous years. 
Initial Report: Annual report associated with initial prosecutions. 
Subsequent Report: Annual report associated with subsequent prosecutions. 
K-W test:  Kruskal-Wallis test for differences between various category groups. 
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TABLE II:  Summary descriptive statistics on the extent of environmental 
disclosure for various locations within the annual report 
Location  Mean Median Std.Dev. Max IQR 
Financial statements 1.14 1.00 1.25 3.00 2.00 
Footnotes 3.41 2.00 4.41 16.00 6.00 
Audited 4.55 4.00 4.82 16.00 8.00 
Directors’ report 0.76 0.00 1.57 6.00 0.50 
Chairman’s report 0.48 0.00 1.35 7.00 0.50 
Non-review 1.24 0.00 2.64 13.00 1.50 
Review of operations 16.14 9.00 18.88 76.00 20.50 
Non-audited 17.38 9.00 19.25 81.00 19.50 
Total Disclosure 21.93 18.00 20.92 90.00 23.50 
Notes to table: 
The locations are defined as follows: 
Total disclosure: Total environmental disclosures in the annual reports. 
Non-audited:  Total environmental disclosures in the non-audited section. 
Audited:  Total environmental disclosures in the audited section of the annual report. 
Non-review:  Continuous variable measuring the environmental disclosures in the non-audit section 
excluding the ‘Review of operations’ section. 
Review of operations:  Environmental disclosures in the ‘Review of operations’. 
Chairman’s report:  Environmental disclosures in the Chairman’s Report. 
Directors’ report:  Environmental disclosures in the Directors’ Report. 
Financial statements:  Environmental disclosures in the income statement, balance sheet and statement of 
cash flows. 
Footnotes:  Environmental disclosures in the notes to the financial statements. 
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TABLE III: Comparison of differences in environmental disclosure across selective 
locations in the annual report 
Location Disclosures Mean 
Difference 
Median 
Difference 
Std.Dev. 
Difference 
IQR 
Difference
No of +/- 
Ranks 
Wilcoxon 
Test 
Non Audited–Audited 
 
12.83 7.00 18.71 14.00 (+) 25 
(-) 3 
3.57  
(<0.000) 
Review–Non Review 14.90 9.00 18.87 22.50 (+) 26 
(-) 1 
4.18  
(<0.000) 
Notes to Table: 
Audited–Non-Audited:  Differences between audited and non-audited section of the annual report. 
Review–Non Review:  Differences between review of operations and other sections (non-review of operations) in 
the non-audited location of the annual report. 
No. of +/- Ranks:  Number of positive (+) and negative (-) ranks out of a total of 29 that occur from matched 
differences between the locations.  The remainder (out of 29) represents ties. 
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TABLE IV: Mean environmental disclosure categories across different annual report locations 
           
Location  
Environmental 
Rule 
Activity/Operating 
Performance 
Activity/Financial 
Performance 
Liability/Expense 
Recognition 
Accounting   
Policy 
Other     
Disclosure 
Total Mean 
Disclosure 
Financial statements - - - 1.14 - - 1.14 
Footnotes 0.62 0.45 0.34 0.93 1.07 - 3.41 
Audited 0.62 0.45 0.34 2.07 1.07 - 4.55 
Directors’ report 0.14 0.38 0.03 0.04 - 0.07 0.76 
Chairman’s report 0.03 0.38 0.03 - 0.04 - 0.48 
Non-review 0.17 0.86 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.07 1.24 
2.90 11.59 0.59 0.58 - 0.48 16.14 
Non-audited 3.07 12.45 0.65 0.62 0.04 0.55 17.38 
Total Disclosure 3.69 12.90 0.99 2.69 1.11 0.55 21.93 
Notes to table: 
Locations are defined as in Table III. 
Category disclosure is as follows: 
Environmental Rules: Note that the company is subject to environmental rule and/or policy even if self imposed. 
Activity/Operating Performance:   Statement about environmental activities and potential impact on company operating performance. 
Activity/Financial Performance:  Statement about environmental activities and potential impact on company financial performance/position. 
Liability/Expense Recognition:  Comment about existing environmental liability/expense recognition. 
Accounting Policy:  Environmental issues and impact on accounting policy. 
Other Disclosure: Miscellaneous other environmental disclosure such as audits, pollution abatements, vision; strategic plan etc. 
Total Disclosure:  Total mean environmental disclosures across all locations. 
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.TABLE V:  Summary descriptive statistics for the independent variables and tests of 
association 
Panel A – Variable statistics and univariate tests:  
Variable Expected 
Sign 
Mean Median Std.Dev IQR ρs
Fine ($000) (+) 15.66 7.00 19.29 23.00 -0.014   
(0.941) 
InfoAsy (%) (+) 14.10 14.20 10.69 10.61 +0.224    
(0.243) 
PropC (%): (-) 56.53 51.47 19.47 31.53 -0.708  
(<0.000) 
Size (ln) (+) 21.51 21.81 1.84 2.31 +0.662  
(<0.000) 
Panel B – Regression analysis: 
Equation: 
t-test: 
p-value (one-tail): 
Ln(GenEnv)i = 0.269  -  0.009 Finei  +  1.487 InfoAsyi  -  2.76 PropCi  +  0.180 Sizei 
 0.11 -1.12 0.92 -2.74 1.77 
 (0.455) (0.137) (0.184) (0.006) (0.046) 
 Adjusted R2: 0.42  F-stat (p-value): 5.89  (0.002) 
Notes to table: 
ρs:  Spearman rank correlation coefficient (p-value in parentheses) between variables and level of environmental 
disclosure (GenEnv). 
 
Variables are defined as follows: 
GenEnv (ln): Natural log of the number of sentences of general environmental disclosure. 
Fine ($000): Dollar value (000’s) amount of fine imposed by EPA for each report period. 
InfoAsy (%): 100 – % of wholly owned subsidiaries. 
PropC (%): 100 – % of market share of the largest company in the industry. 
Size (ln):  Natural log of the sum of the market value of equity plus book value of liabilities. 
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Appendix A- List of Companies 
Parent Entity Company Fined State  Fine  Fine Year  Act 
Abigroup  NSW $ 25,000 1997 CWA 
Amcor  VIC $ 5,000 1996 EP ACT/CWA 
Amcor VIC $ 6,000 1998* EP ACT/CAA 
AV Jennings Homes  Jennings Group  VIC $ 500 1997 LITTER 
Broken Hill Proprietary 
Company (BHP) 
Australian Iron and Steel  NSW $ 30,000 1994 CAA 
BHP BHP Pty Co  NSW $ 7,500 1994 CAA 
BHP BHP Pty Co  NSW $ 15,000 1994 CWA 
BHP BHP (AIS) Steel  NSW $ 25,000 1995* PCA 
BHP Amcast Foundry  VIC $ 4,500 1995* CWA 
BHP BHP Steel  NSW $ 25,000 1996* CAA 
BHP BHP Steel  NSW $ 27,000 1997* CWA 
Boral  Hi-Quality Concrete NSW $ 250 1994 CAA 
Boral Boral Victoria VIC $ 5,000 1997* EP ACT/CWA 
Brambles Industries  Brambles Australia  VIC $ 1,500 1994 EP ACT 
Brambles Industries Movements International 
Movers 
NSW $ 3,000 1997* CAA 
Burns Philip & Co  Terminals  VIC $ 8,000 1996 EP ACT/CAA 
Caltex  Caltex Refining Co  NSW $ 10,000 1995 PCA 
Caltex Caltex Refining Co  NSW $ 5,000 1995 PCA 
CSR  VIC $ 7,000 1995 CAA 
CSR Softwood Holdings VIC $ 5,000 1998* EP ACT 
CSR Readymix Group NSW $ 250 1998* CAA 
George Weston Foods  NSW $ 5,000 1998 CWA 
Goodman Fielder  Meadow Lea VIC $ 2,500 1997 EP ACT/CWA 
Goodman Fielder  Leiner Davis QLD  $ 50,000 1997 EP ACT 
Incitec  NSW $ 1,500 1997 CAA 
Joe White Maltings   NSW $ 1,000 1996 CWA 
Joe White Maltings  NSW $ 1,000 1996 CWA 
Kolback Group  Camide  NSW $ 1,000 1997 PCA 
McConnell Dowell Corp  McConnell Dowell 
Constructions 
NSW $ 10,000 1997 CWA 
McConnell Dowell Corp McConnell Dowell 
Constructions 
NSW $ 10,000 1997 CWA 
Metal Manufactures  NSW $ 25,000 1996 CWA 
Metal Manufactures NSW $ 30,000 1997* CWA 
Normandy Mining  Kalgoorlie Consolidated 
Gold Mine 
WA $ 2,000 1998 EP ACT 
Pacific Dunlop  Pacific Dunlop Tyres  VIC $ 1,500 1995 CWA 
Pioneer International  Ampol  NSW $ 75,000 1995 EOPA 
Pioneer International Pioneer Road Services NSW $ 10,000 1995 CWA 
Wesfarmers CSPB and Farmers  WA $ 10,000 1994 EP ACT 
Wesfarmers WA $ 14,000 1997* EP ACT 
Notes to appendix: 
PCA = Pollution Control Act. 
CAA = Clean Air Act. 
CWA = Clean Water Act. 
EOPA = Environmental Offences and Penalties Act. 
EP ACT = Environment Protection Act. 
Litter = Litter Act.  
*Indicates annual report years that are excluded from the initial report group. 
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